The lowercase terms are meant to denote an asymmetric relationship of metaphysical (or ontological) dependence without specifying its exact nature (Raven 2015). Second, I distinguish between, on the one hand, “grounding” or “ground,” and, on the other hand, “Grounding” (Wilson 2014). My aim is not to define “physical” but to explore the metaphysical relationship that is supposed to hold between the physical (assuming that “physical” can be defined in some way) and everything else (the non-physical). I will not, however, deal with them in this essay. I am aware of the many difficulties that such a proposed articulation of “physical” faces (e.g., Hempel 1969, 1980 Chomsky 2000 Crane and Mellor 1990 Melnyk 1997). Rather, “non-physical” denotes things or entities that (a) are not found in the descriptions of the current (or slightly modified future) physics and (b) are assumed to exist contingently and concretely in our world. “Non-physical” does not mean anti-physical, i.e., entities the existence of which is inconsistent with the truth of physicalism. The phrase “physical nature of the world” will refer to the pattern of physical properties, relations, particulars, etc., that according to current (or slightly modified future) physics is instantiated in our world. “Physical” is not co-extensive with “microphysical” current physics contains branches of physics that deal with macroscopic phenomena, such as solid-state physics and astrophysics, and it is best to remain neutral as to whether these phenomena can be reduced without remainder to the microphysical. First, “physical” will be taken to denote the set of entities mentioned in either current physics or a slightly modified version of it. The non-physical nature of the world, in other words, holds in virtue of the world’s physical nature and precisely because it depends on it in such a fashion, physicalists maintain that the non-physical is nothing over and above the physical. The former stands as the ground for everything else. Indeed, the physical nature of the world is claimed to be more fundamental than the economic, social, biological, and even mental nature of our world. Some things (objects, properties, events) are more fundamental than others. Not everything according to their picture is metaphysically on a par. They have long given up the idea that our world is (metaphysically) flat. To use Karen Bennett’s wonderfully suggestive term, most proponents of physicalism deny “flatworldism” (Bennett 2011, p. 28). It aims to tell us not only what exists but also how it exists: that is, how certain things are because of, arise out of, or hold in virtue of, some other things (Schaffer 2009 Rosen 2010). Physicalism is instead advanced with the hopes of capturing the underlying structure of our world. Footnote 4 Physicalists do not aspire of conjuring up long lists enumerating what exists (Jackson 1994, 1998). Physicalism, however, is not just ontology it is also, and importantly so, metaphysics (Schaffer 2009). Footnote 3 Immaterial angels, ectoplasmatic lions, and Cartesian souls are not to be found in our world, whereas leptons, molecules, mountains, desks, minds, and democracies are. Footnote 2 If physicalism is true, every thing that both (contingently and concretely) exists and plays a causal role in our world is, in some sense, physical. Footnote 1 To espouse physicalism is to make certain commitments about what types of things (objects, properties, events, states of affairs) exist in our world (Quine 1948 cf. Nonetheless, it offers both an updated appraisal of our current understanding of physicalism and concrete proposals for how to move forward.Īt the heart of physicalism lies an ontological (or if you prefer, ontic) thesis. The special issue is neither the first nor the last word on the topic of the character physicalism. New ways of formulating physicalism are assessed old ways are defended and the distinctions between physicalism, naturalism, and dualism are reconsidered. Each contribution to the special is, in different ways, concerned with explicating the character of physicalism. 9, the six papers that comprise the special issue are introduced and summarized. In the end, some important lessons are drawn and different options for physicalists are presented. Some of these accounts are found to be problematic others are shown to be somewhat more promising. In those sections, I present and evaluate different ways in which proponents of physicalism have made explicit the metaphysical dependence that is said to hold between the non-physical and the physical. 1– 8 offer a critical introduction to the metaphysical character of physicalism. The aim of this editorial introduction is twofold.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |